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Abstract 
This paper examines some of the features of rules of origin (RoO) that makes these policy instruments 
nontariff measures, reflects on the causes of the longstanding deadlock in the WTO on multilateral 
harmonization of non-preferential RoO, and reviews recent trends in RoO included in recent 
preferential trade agreements(PTAs) involving the EU and/or the US. These reveal a steady and 
substantial movement towards adoption of similar approaches and illustrate that cooperation to reduce 
the trade-impeding effects of differences in RoO across jurisdictions is feasible. We argue that from a 
trade facilitation perspective such cooperation can and should pursue greater convergence between 
preferential and nonpreferential RoO, building on the developments observed in PTAs. 
Keywords 
Rules of origin, WTO, nontariff measures, trade agreements, convergence 
JEL codes: F13, F15, F53 
  1 
Introduction* 
Trade agreements require the parties to agree on the rules (regulations) that will determine whether a 
product is eligible to benefit from whatever provisions are embodied in the agreement. Thus, to be 
eligible for preferential market access benefits an exporter will need to document that the product has 
been produced in an eligible country. Such preferential rules of origin (RoO) have been the focus of 
much research, lobbying and policy debate. To a significant extent the more difficult it is for exporters 
to satisfy RoO – the more restrictive or stringent the RoO are – the less valuable preferential access 
will be. Less well-known and studied are non-preferential RoO. These are needed to determine 
whether a product is subject to a nation’s trade policy. For example, if the EU imposes an antidumping 
measure on imports of a product originating in China, there is need to determine the origin of that 
product to avoid possible circumvention.
1
 The same is true when it comes to access to government 
procurement markets: if India opens up access to public procurement contracts to firms from China, it 
will be necessary to determine whether goods are eligible – i.e., what constitutes a Chinese product. 
More generally, all countries regulate what constitutes the origin of a product (so-called marks of 
origin or country of origin labelling) for consumer information reasons, to be able to implement health 
and safety-related regulations, for statistical purposes, and so forth.  
RoO differ across countries and products. The most commonly used approaches are based on 
whether a manufacturing or other processing operation results in: (i) an ad valorem percentage 
calculated according to different approaches;
2
 (ii) a change in tariff heading (how a product is 
classified in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (the Harmonized System or 
HS), the WCO tariff classification nomenclature used by WTO members; or (iii) involves a specific 
technology, method or process. A recent trend is the adoption of an upper bound on the amount or 
share of imported (non-originating) physical materials that may be embodied in a product. The latter is 
easier for firms to understand and to comply with than value added based criteria, and has been 
advocated by low-income countries in the context of non-reciprocal preferential market access 
programs implemented by OECD nations and emerging economies. 
Differences in specific RoO across products that are applied by importing countries increase the 
complexity of trade policy for businesses, generates trade costs and affects investment and sourcing 
decisions in ways that can reduce efficiency. In addition, differences between countries in the RoO for 
the same product further increases complexity for traders that sell to multiple markets. Differences 
across RoO regimes maintained by importing countries create costs for firms as they imply that firms 
seeking to benefit from preferential access regimes will need to ensure that production processes are 
tailored so as to satisfy each RoO regime that prevails in each market they sell to. Such effects also 
arise in the case for non-preferential RoO: differences across countries, both in terms of substantive 
requirements and in terms of labelling, will imply specific fixed costs of exporting to different 
markets. Thus, RoO act as NTMs for any given market, and differences in RoO across markets have 
analogous effects as difference in regulatory requirements for the same product in different countries. 
Reducing this heterogeneity is an obvious way to reduce the costs that are associated with RoO. As 
discussed below, this has long been on the multilateral trade policy agenda, but only for non-
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1 In practice the link with trade defence mechanisms like antidumping is addressed in major jurisdictions such as the US 
and EU through special anti-circumvention measures. See Inama, Vermulst and Eeckhout (2009).  
2
 Such approaches may be summarized as i) whether a minimum share of the value added embodied in a product was the 
result of activities in the last country in which the product was processed/produce according to different calculation 
techniques or ii) a given percentage of non-originating materials has not been exceeded or a minimum percentage of 
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preferential RoO. The reason is that preferential RoO have long been held to fall outside the ambit of 
the WTO because i) non-reciprocal trade preferences are granted at the discretion of importing 
countries and ii) in the case of reciprocal trade agreements (FTAs) there has been a tacit consensus 
that each WTO members would be better off to have free hands in this area, i.e. acceptance of policy 
space  
Economic research on RoO has largely been focused on estimating their trade-distorting effects, 
often using methodologies that are centred on determining the ad valorem tariff equivalents of RoO
3
 or 
classifying RoO into types and constructing indexes in order to assess patterns of convergence or 
divergence across countries and trade agreements.
4
 While such efforts are useful in determining how 
RoO can (and do) act as nontariff barriers to trade, this type of research is not particularly useful in 
informing efforts by governments to cooperate on RoO with a view to facilitate trade. This requires 
detailed analysis of the specific RoO adopted by different countries and trade blocs and their 
evolution, and an understanding of where governments have been able to adopt rules that are similar. 
Such analysis has been lacking as an input into the WTO Harmonization Work Programme (HWP) for 
non-preferential RoO. Recent PTAs provide important information on this question. 
In what follows we first briefly review the state of play in the WTO and private sector perspectives 
on RoO (Section 1). In section 2 we discuss evidence for a reduction in regulatory heterogeneity in the 
area of preferential RoO as a result of recent PTAs. Ongoing research suggests that many of the 
preferential RoO adopted in recent PTAs are not very different from the draft harmonized non-
preferential RoO that emerged from WTO deliberations in some sectors. While there are still 
significant differences in RoO across products and countries, there is also a trend towards a greater 
degree of convergence. Section 3 discusses approaches towards developing a taxonomy for codifying 
RoO as NTMs as opposed to efforts to measure trends in convergence and divergence in the RoO used 
by major trading powers. Section 4 concludes.  
1. WTO Rules and Negotiations on Harmonization of Non-preferential RoO  
The GATT left importing nations free to define what criteria or conditions they apply to determine the 
origin of a product as long as this applies on a most-favoured-nation basis. The same applies to 
preferential access programs for developing countries: these may not discriminate across eligible 
developing exporting countries. 
5
 However, there have been efforts over time to establish greater 
multilateral discipline on RoO during the Uruguay round that culminated with adoption of the WTO 
Agreement on Rules of Origin (ARO). In the case of implementation of unilateral preferential 
programs, starting in 2005 developed countries committed to facilitate exports of the least-developed 
countries (LDCs) by providing these nations with duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) access for at least 97 
percent of product lines. A number of OECD countries, including the EU member states, have 
implemented programs that provide DFQF access to all products except arms. This gave rise to 
discussion in the WTO on RoO as the LDCs argued that strict RoO substantially reduced the value of 
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 See, e.g., Cadot and Ing (2016), Cadot, Carrere, de Melo and Tumurchudur (2006) and Conconi et al. (2016). 
4
 Estevadeordal et al. (2009). 
5
 RoO are an important dimension of free trade agreements, but the GATT/WTO does not impose any rules on the RoO 
that signatories of such agreements apply notwithstanding the general recognition that such RoO are not just a matter of 
concern to participating countries but can affect third parties. For example, in the context of the 1972 FTA between the 
EEC and EFTA States, the US argued that the rules of origin would generate ‘…trade diversion by raising barriers to 
third countries’ exports of intermediate manufactured products and raw materials. This resulted from unnecessarily high 
requirements for value originating within the area. In certain cases the rules disqualify goods with value originating 
within the area as high as 96 percent. The rules of origin limited non-originating components to just five percent of the 
value of a finished product of the same tariff heading [for] nearly one-fifth of all industrial tariff headings. In many other 
cases a 20 percent rule applied’ (GATT, 1974:152-53 cited in Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). For further discussion of 
WTO rules on PTAs and RoO, see Mavroidis (2016).  
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DFQF access. As a result there have been deliberations and some progress in agreeing to adopt RoO 
that are simpler and easier to satisfy.  
The pursuit of incremental convergence in the RoO that apply for LDCs has complemented the 
long-running effort to agree to harmonize RoO for non-preferential trade policy purposes. Talks on 
harmonizing non-preferential rules of origin have long been deadlocked because of differences 
between the EU and the US, in part because of concerns relating to the implications of harmonization 
for the use of trade policy instruments such as antidumping. Although a deal in the WTO proved 
elusive, the EU and the US have in recent years engaged in the negotiation of reciprocal PTAs that 
require agreement on the RoO that will apply. A number of ‘mega-regional’ trade initiatives, most 
notably the CETA (Canada-EU), bilateral agreements between South Korea and the EU and the US, 
respectively, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are cases in point. These agreements have 
required deals to be struck on RoO.  
The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin (ARO) requires that non-preferential RoO be applied in 
non-discriminatory manner, are transparent, are not designed to be a barrier to trade, and are 
administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner. It does not impose 
substantive obligations on the content or design of RoO during the transitional period. The ARO set 
the ambitious objective of the adoption of a single set of nonpreferential rules of origin “equally for all 
purposes “6 to avoid a situation where RoO may vary across products and may even vary for a given 
product depending on the type of trade policy instrument they apply to. In practice, a country may use 
more restrictive RoO for antidumping actions than it does, for example, to trade in the same product(s) 
that occurs under the umbrella of a mutual recognition agreement pertaining to applicable technical 
standards.  
Besides the goal of using the same RoO for all purposes (which does not require harmonization across 
countries), the most important objective of the ARO is to work towards the harmonization of non-preferential 
RoO (Art. 9) across countries. This has been pursued through a Harmonization Work Programme (HWP) 
managed by the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin, and primarily executed by a Technical Committee that 
involves the active participation of the World Customs Organization (WCO). The ARO provides for the 
development a set of nonpreferential harmonized set of RoO based on the change of tariff classification (using 
the Harmonized System) as the preferred method to define substantial transformation
7
. In cases where the HS 
nomenclature does not allow substantial transformation to be determined by a change in tariff classification test, 
the Technical Committee will consider the use of supplementary tests such as value added criteria or to agree on 
‘specific manufacturing processes’ that if used will confer origin (imply sufficient transformation of a product). 
The HWP was to be completed in July 1998. Results of the technical review undertaken by the 
WCO were submitted to the WTO by a revised deadline of November 1999. As of today, however, the 
HWP and the associated draft text has yet to be completed by the Committee on Rules of Origin. 
Despite considerable progress, as witnessed by the development of a draft text, a final consensus could 
not be obtained. This reflects opposition of some World Trade Organization (WTO) members, 
including the United States, to the implications of the results of the HWP on across different WTO 
agreements. That is, there is resistance to adoption of a set of rules of origin that would harmonize 
RoO across trade policy instruments – e.g., antidumping vs. health and safety standards vs. labelling – 
and the associated reduction in discretion for the implementation of the associated policies. This so-
called “implications issue” led to the cessation of formal negotiations in the mid-2000s. Discussions 
since 2007 have been limited to updating the draft text to reflect a new versions of the Harmonized 
System and informal workshops on the implications of the absence of harmonised RoO for business.  
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2. RoO in recent PTAs 
Despite the stalemate on non-preferential RoO, negotiations on preferential RoO have thrived as a 
result of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and efforts by developing countries to enhance the 
economic salience of non-reciprocal preferential market access programs. A basic tenet (the 
conventional wisdom) of most RoO experts and trade officials is there are no possible spillovers 
among preferential and non-preferential RoO, since they serve different trade policy objectives. 
Preferential RoO serve to determine whether a preferential tariff is applicable under a RTA or a 
unilateral arrangement, while non-preferential RoO serve to determine the application of a most-
favoured nation (MFN) tariff or specific WTO agreements.  
Recent research on private industry views and experience and views on dealing with RoO reveals 
that this distinction is not very important for firms. For many firms compliance with rules of origin is a 
normal part of a business transaction that has a cost. The main difference between preferential and 
non-preferential RoO is that the former are associated with an expected benefit of reduced duty or duty 
free entry in the export market, but in many cases companies are obliged to comply with RoO in any 
event. A recent survey (Anliker, 2016) revealed a 100 percent awareness by respondent companies of 
non-preferential RoO, with some 55 percent of firms perceiving non-preferential rules to be relevant to 
their daily operations. Reasons for this included such RoO being demanded by clients, by importing 
country Customs authorities and/or financial service providers (e.g., for letters of credit). This helps to 
explain why large companies are prepared to incur the cost of buying and maintaining sophisticated IT 
systems and related personnel to be able to more efficiently assure compliance with RoO – both 
preferential and non-preferential. Smaller companies are generally less aware and less able to assess 
the importance of RoO in their day to day business. Most companies favour harmonizing RoO to as a 
measures to facilitate trade and bring down cost of compliance, with a clear preference for greater 
acceptance and use of self-declaration of origin by firms as opposed to having to use certificates of 
origin issued by certifying authorities or Chambers of Commerce (the latter generally give rise to fees 
associated with obtaining such certification). 
There has been considerable evolution in the technique and content of drafting RoO in PTAs. 
South-South agreements — e.g., the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — traditionally adopted a 
simple formula, such as an across-the-board percentage criterion mirroring the percentage rules in the 
US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme. In addition they often adopted as an alternative 
a change of tariff heading criterion following the EU model. In short, these PTAs have not developed 
their own RoO model. Over time they started to develop product specific rules of origin (PSRO), but 
again borrowing the drafting techniques from the existing US and EU models. Indeed, there have been 
cases where following negotiation of a PTA with the EU or US countries have imposed the associated 
RoO on their regional partners in the South.  
Despite the claimed rigid separation between non-preferential and preferential RoO, the border 
between the two regimes has always been porous. NAFTA had a major influence on the ARO. It was 
US insistence that resulted in the ARO making the change of tariff classification (CTC) the preferred 
methodology for drafting rules for non-preferential RoO – as opposed to the EU approach of using a 
combination of criteria – the CTC, percentage criterion and specific working and processing 
requirements. By itself this could be interpreted as a first sign of convergence, even though there are 
different modalities across PTAs in drafting RoO according to the CTC criterion. This primacy of the 
CTC over other methodologies for determining substantial transformation gave rise to some 
differences in view during the initial phases of the HWP negotiations among the EU and NAFTA 
partners in the Technical Committee on Rules of Origin (TCRO) and later in the WTO Committee on 
Rules of Origin (CRO). In fact, the 1996-1999 TCRO negotiations on non-preferential RoO was the 
first time the EU and the US had confronted each other. Until then the EU had for some 20-plus years 
been dealing with RoO in the context of its PTAs with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
Rules of Origin as Non-Tariff Measures: Towards Greater Regulatory Convergence 
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members and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. These countries were confronted 
with the then newly matured experience of the US and its partners obtained in negotiating the Canada-
US Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and the NAFTA.  
While none of the negotiators in the TCRO at that time would have admitted that preferential RoO 
had a bearing on the HWP, it was clear, as demonstrated by the dynamic of the negotiations, that the 
discussions on non-preferential RoO started from the respective preferential RoO backgrounds, at least 
at the technical level. In other words, each “bloc” proposed and defended its own model of RoO. The 
eventual draft text that emerged from the HWP was therefore the result of a compromise between the 
EU and NAFTA models, with a number of innovations and some disagreement on specific sectors, 
like machinery.
8
 In retrospect, the 1999 draft harmonized rules of origin (HRO) text represents a 
tangible sign of convergence that, even if not agreed, influenced the way RoO were negotiated in 
subsequent PTAs. An example is the progressive acceptance of the use of the wholly obtained 
criterion as a requirement for the list of product-specific rules (a typical EU feature) included in the 
EU-Mexico agreement and later in the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA). Another example is the use of chemical reaction, a concept inherited from the HWP work, as 
a specific requirement for some chemical products given the inherent technical difficulty of 
determining the corresponding CTC for chemical products.  
Despite the HWP coming to a standstill in 2007, the many PTAs that have been negotiated since 
then have implied that RoO are front and centre in the negotiating agenda of the majority of WTO 
members. The EU in particular has made substantial changes to its RoO model starting in the early 
2000s. First, it progressively abandoned the “straight jacket” model that it imposed on itself as a result 
of its Pan-European RoO that were adopted in the early 1990s. According to the Pan European RoO 
model each EU partner in a FTA had to adopt an almost identical set of rules of origin set by the EU 
including the PSROs to allow cumulation among different FTAs and avoid a proliferation of divergent 
RoO across FTAs. While strictly adhered to for more than a decade this approach was revealed to be 
excessively rigid when EU was negotiating with significant trading partners because it did not allow 
concessions to be made on PSROs. Second, it introduced a sweeping and unprecedented reform of 
unilateral RoO, especially for the LDCs. While limited to this set of countries, this reform provides a 
potential base on which to build in further reforms of EU RoO.  
The developments in preferential RoO in PTAs have led to some simplification and streamlining of 
the RoO, informed by lessons learned over more 20 years of operation of major PTAs. Progressively, 
the EU and the US, as well as counterpart OECD nations (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Australia, and 
New Zealand) have abandoned methodologies based on calculations of value added in favour of a 
value of materials used ad valorem percentage calculation. Some innovations have also been 
introduced, such as the deduction of cost of freight and insurance in recent US PTAs and in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). There are, of course, differences in the arithmetical calculations and 
definitions of what goes into the numerator and denominator, but there is convergence towards 
determining ad valorem percentages based on a value of materials calculation rather than a value 
added or net cost approach, as used in NAFTA for automotive products. This tendency is confirmed 
by the evolution of the use of the net cost method in US PTAs that has been gradually introduced in 
subsequent agreements, and the introduction of the build-up and build-down method that has replaced 
the transaction value used in NAFTA – see Table 1. 
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Table 1. Evolution of the NAFTA percentage-calculation based RoO 
Regional value 
content criterion 
NAFTA CHL-USA CAFTA US-SIN US-AUS US-KOR TPP 
No. of PSRO 1,125 1,043 1,017 2,974 965 758 1,245 
of which:        
Net cost  323 0 6 0 0 6 22 
Transaction 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Build-up 0 164 146 239 148 147 398 
Build-down 0 157 147 213 144 152 457 
Source: Own calculations.  Note: PRSO: product-specific RoO. 
Thus, developments regarding preferential RoO in the PTAs that include the major players are 
pointing towards simplification and streamlining. This has supported greater trade as shown by the 
relatively high utilisation rate of major PTAs, which range from 80 percent to 90 percent (Swedish 
Board of Trade and UNCTAD, 2017). In a nutshell, there has been a lot of work on RoO that has had a 
pay-off.  
The reforms of the Canadian GSP rules of origin for LDC (in 2003) and the EBA rules of origin 
(redefined in 2011) have contributed to the debate over simplification and relaxation of preferential 
RoO for LDC DFQF programs and brought new life to the discussions in the CRO. This has led to two 
Ministerial Decisions on preferential RoO for LDCs and is a tangible sign that progress can be made at 
the multilateral level as well. The challenge now is to build on this progress to resume work at the 
multilateral level on RoO.  
3. Determining convergence in RoO and codifying RoO as NTMs 
a) A taxonomy to identify convergence in RoO 
The lack of progress and meaningful discussions on RoO at the multilateral level since 2007 contrasts 
with the gradual movement towards de facto and de jure convergence across both preferential and 
non-preferential RoO in major jurisdictions. Divergence certainly continues to exist for some sectors, 
but it is important to recognize that the situation on the ground has been changing. This suggests that 
multilateral discussions can build on this and focus on the reasons for continued divergence in specific 
sectors.  
In pursuing reforms and better understand RoO regimes it is necessary to distinguish between the 
policy-objectives that underpin a given set of RoO (the “substance”) from the specific criteria used 
and how they are administered, i.e., the “format” of a RoO. The substantive dimension of a RoO is the 
degree of restrictiveness it implies as regards the value chain it impacts on. It is the substance that 
matters. If countries have common objectives as to what RoO are supposed to do, it is much more 
straightforward to achieve convergence, since the form a RoO takes is mostly a matter of drafting 
methodology.  
Although blocked for almost a decade at the time of writing, the mandate of the CRO to pursue 
harmonization of RoO provides a continuing opportunity to revitalize multilateral discussion on RoO 
at the WTO by drawing on and building on PTA experiences as well as unilateral reforms. Making 
progress in the CRO – or for that matter in developing the RoO associated with new PTAs – requires a 
better understanding of how different RoO evolved in international trade.  
As discussed above the traditional type of research carried out on RoO has not been particularly 
conducive to lead governments towards a simplification of RoO. A new stream of research
9
 aims at 
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showing to governments the progress that they have been able to make trough progressive rounds of 
negotiations with their partners in different PTAs, through consultations with their civil society, and 
practice. This research shows, at product specific level ,where governments have adopted rules of 
origin that are similar, either as a result of natural evolution of the international trading system 
( presumably lowering of MFN tariffs and related trade barriers) and/or technological progress. Such 
analysis shows at product specific level a comparison of the WTO Harmonization Work Programme 
(HWP) for non-preferential RoO with recent PTAs providing important and factual information on 
how Government may simplify RoO. For each agreement there are around 6000 product-specific RoO 
observations. 
One possible advantage of this approach is that simplification may be undertaken at sectoral level, 
if governments are not willing to embrace encompassing reforms. This à la carte approach may 
provide the kind of “comfort level” that may generate reflections in Government and movement in 
WTO circles. In fact hundreds of PTAs have been negotiated and progressively implemented since 
NAFTA. Each of these PTAs contain a set of rules of origin. While the negotiations on the HWP 
stagnated since 2007 thousands of PSRO have been negotiated and put to a test during PTAs 
implementation. The scope of the research is to revisit the overall “state of the art” of rules of origin 
by drawing a detailed comparison as follows: 
 A sub- heading by sub-heading (6366 sub-headings) analysis of product specific rules of origin 
(PSRO) to identify where there is convergence, partial convergence or divergence among: 
 a) The results of the HWP process as last updated; 
 b) TPP and US-Korea FTA as A North American Model mainly based on CTC and RVC; and 
 c) CETA – the first instance of the European model and the North American model coming to 
confront each other – and the EU-South Korea FTA. 
In order to draw such a comparison a taxonomy has been developed to compare each of the PSRO 
contained in the abovementioned PTA according to the following categories: 
A. Totally or partial convergent 
1. All rules of origin (the 4 FTA’s and the HW) are identical or similar in terms of 
stringency and drafting form 
2. The majority of the RoO are identical or similar in terms of stringency and drafting 
form 
3. Rules of origin are identical or similar in terms of stringency but have a different 
drafting form 
B. Divergent 
4 Ai) Different in terms of stringency and drafting form being more stringent compared 
with the Harmonized rules (4Ai)  
4 Bii) Different in terms of stringency and drafting form being less stringent compared with 
the Harmonized rules (4Bii) 
The preliminary result of this research (Crivelli and Inama, 2017) clearly show that there is a 
predominant tendency towards convergence and simplification: 53% of the total tariff lines at six digit 
level shows a degree of convergence albeit of different level (Table 2). If the percentage of tariff lines 
where the PRSO have been found to be more liberal in the PTAs examined than with the HWP
10
 
                                                     
10
 The results of the HWP in terms of PSRO are widely considered to be more liberal since it involves a set of 
nonpreferential rules of origin. 
Bernard Hoekman and Stefano Inama 
8 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
(33%) is added we reach a total percentage of 85% where the PSRO taken together are ether 
convergent and/or liberal.  
Table 2. Comparison of 6-digit PRSO: HWP, CETA, US-Korea, EU Korea, and TPP 
Convergence/ 
Divergence 
categories Category description 
No. of 
tariff 
lines Share 
Average 
MFN 
Total QUAD 
imports from 
the world 
 (US$ million) 
1 Totally convergent 135 2% 1,52 641,546 
2 Partially convergent 1’287 20% 2,76 2298,623 
3 
Partially convergent in stringency 
and different drafting form 1’994 31% 3,15 1648,448 
4Ai 
Divergent more stringent 
compared with harmonized rules 823 13% 5,49 960,754 
4Bii 
Divergent less stringent compared 
with harmonized rules 2‘127 33% 6,00 1,321,871 
Total   6‘366 100% 
  Source: Crivelli and Inama (2017). 
 
A number of caveats should be made. The first is that these preliminary results need to be further 
refined and validated. Second, the details matter a lot for PSRO. Third, the degree of convergence may 
be assessed differently in a negotiating context. Fourth the convergence covers PRSO and does not 
deal with other ancillary concepts of rules of origin such as cumulation and de minimis thresholds. 
That said, the numbers reveal some clear message to those who may be ready to listen. These can be 
summarized as follows: 
 There are sectors where there is significant convergence (chemicals for instance that was also 
one of the sector where there was an early harvest in the TTIP negotiations  
 The differences relates more on the “form”: i.e. the way in which the RoO are drafted than on 
substance i.e. the leniency/ stringency of the RoO 
 For some sensitive sectors, e.g., clothing and fisheries there is a substantial divergence  
The extent to which these PRSO are convergent/divergent is illustrated further in Tables 3 and 4. 
These tables provide examples of cases of convergence for some sectors, as well as continued areas of 
divergence. Parts of the text in Table 3 that are underlined indicate instances where there is significant 
convergence or equivalence among the agreements. To some extent recent progress towards 
convergence between preferential and non-preferential RoO and more generally simplification of RoO 
has been facilitated by the removal of MFN tariffs for products – e.g., because of the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) and analogous zero-for-zero sectoral agreements for chemical products. 
However, there are also other sectors with positive MFN duties where convergence has been 
occurring. What is needed now is further research to validate the initial findings and narrow down the 
results and most of all a political momentum to trigger the change. The results presented here suggest 
that there is value in seeking to identify emerging “best practices” for sectors where there is 
convergence and to identify sectors where there is continued divergence. 
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Table 3. HRO, CETA, TPP, EU and US PTAs with South Korea: signs of convergence 
Example 1 
HS Code HRO CETA TPP EU_KOR US-KOR 
28.50 
Hydrides, nitrides, azides, 
silicides and borides, 
whether or not chemically 
defined, other than 
compounds which are also 
carbides of heading 28.49. 
CTH 
A change from any other subheading, or: 
A change from within any one of these 
subheadings, whether or not there is also a change 
from any other subheading, provided that the 
value of non-originating materials classified in the 
same subheading as the final product does not 
exceed 20 per cent of the transaction value or ex-
works price of the product. 
A change to a 
good of 
heading 28.50 
from any other 
heading. 
Manufacture from materials of any 
heading, except that of the product. 
However, materials of the same heading 
as the product may be used, provided 
that their total value does not exceed 
20% of the ex-works price of the 
product 
A change to 
heading 28.10 
through 28.53 
from any other 
heading. 
 
Example 2 
HS Code HRO CETA TPP EU_KOR US-KOR 
87.12 
Bicycles and 
other cycles 
(including 
delivery 
tricycles), not 
motorized 
CTH, except 
from 
heading 
87.14; or 
35% value 
added rule 
A change from any other 
heading, except from 87.14; or 
A change from heading 87.14, 
whether or not there is also a 
change from any other 
heading, provided that the 
value of non-originating 
materials of heading 87.14 
does not exceed 50% of the 
transaction value or ex- works 
price of the product 
A change to a good of heading 87.12 from any other 
heading, except from heading 87.14; or 
No change in tariff classification required for a good 
of heading 87.12, provided there is a regional value 
content of not less than: 
a) 35% under the build-up method; 
or 
b) 45% under the build-down method; or 
60 per cent under the focused value method taking 
into account only the non- originating materials of 
heading 87.12 and 87.14 
Manufacture in 
which the value of 
all the materials 
used does not 
exceed 45% of the 
ex-works price of 
the product 
A change to heading 
87.12 through 87.13 
from any other heading, 
except from heading 
87.14; or, provided that 
there is a regional value 
content of not less than: 
(a) 35 percent under the 
build-up method, or (b) 
45 percent under the 
build-down method.  
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Table 4. HRO, CETA, TPP, EU and US PTAs with South Korea: signs of divergence 
Example 1 
HS Code HRO CETA TPP EU_KOR US-KOR 
16.04 
Prepared or preserved fish; 
caviar and caviar substitutes 
prepared from fish eggs. 
CTH 
A change from any 
other chapter, except 
from Chapter 3 
A change to a good of 
heading 16.05 from any 
other chapter. 
Manufacture: 
-for animals of Chapter 1, and/or 
- in which all the materia1s of Chapter 3 
used are wholly obtained 
A change to heading 
16.05 from any other 
chapter 
Example 2 
HS Code HRO CETA TPP EU_KOR US-KOR 
6203.42 
Men’s 
Cotton 
Pants 
Change to 
goods of this 
split chapter 
provided that 
the goods are 
assembled in 
a single 
country in 
accordance 
with Chapter 
Note. 
Weaving accompanied by 
making up (including 
cutting); or 
Making up preceded by 
printing accompanied by at 
least two preparatory or 
finishing operations (such 
as scouring, bleaching, 
mercerising, heat setting, 
raising, calendaring, shrink 
resistance processing, 
permanent finishing, 
decatising, impregnating, 
mending and hurling), 
provided that the value of 
the unprinted fabric used 
does not exceed 47.5 per 
cent of the transaction 
value or ex-works price of 
the product. 
A change to a good of 
heading 62.01 through 62.08 
from any other chapter, 
except 
from heading 51.06 through 
51.13,  
52.04 through 52.12 or 
54.01 through 54.02, 
subheading 5403.33 through 
5403.39 or 
5403.42 through 5403.49, or 
heading 54.04 through 
54.08, 55.08 through 55.16, 
58.01 through 58.02 or 
60.01 through 60.06, 
provided the good is cut or 
knit to shape, or both, and 
sewn or otherwise 
assembled in the territory of 
one or more of the Parties. 
Weaving accompanied by making-up 
(including cutting) or 
Embroidering accompanied by making up 
(including cutting), provided that the value of 
the unembroidered fabric used does not 
exceed 40 % of the ex-works price of the 
product or 
Coating accompanied by making up (including 
cutting), provided that the value of the 
uncoated fabric used does not exceed 40% of 
the ex works price of the product or 
Making-up preceded by printing accompanied 
by at least two preparatory finishing 
operations (such as scouring, bleaching, 
mercerising, heat setting, raising, calendaring, 
shrink resistance processing, permanent 
finishing, decatising, impregnating, mending 
and hurling), provided that the value of the 
unprinted fabric used does not exceed 47.5% 
of the ex-works price of the product 
A change to subheading 
6203.41 through 6203.49 
from any other 4-20 chapter, 
except 
from heading 51.06 through 
51.13, 52.04 through 52.12, 
53.07 through 53.08, or 
53.10 through 53.11, 54.01 
through 54.02, 
subheading 5403.33 through 
5403.39, 5403.42 through 
heading 54.08, or 
heading 55.08 through 
55.16, 58.01 through 58.02, 
or 
60.01 through 60.06, 
provided that the good is 
both cut and sewn or 
otherwise assembled in the 
territory of one or both of 
the Parties. 
 
Rules of Origin as Non-Tariff Measures: Towards Greater Regulatory Convergence 
European University Institute 11 
b) RoO as NTMs 
Developing a taxonomy of RoO as constituting different types of NTMs may serve a number of 
purposes. One is simply to map the universe of RoO – to document the RoO used by different 
countries. Another is to characterize RoO regimes depending on qualitative dimensions – e.g., their 
complexity, stability over time, etc. Researchers frequently are interested in determining the trade 
restrictiveness of different RoO, and a taxonomy of RoO can be useful as an input into empirical 
analysis. In terms of quantification (counts) of RoO, a taxonomy should codify rules of origin is to 
codify RoO at the product specific level. To ensure this is comparable across countries and preferential 
trade regimes, such an effort needs to be undertaken at the 6-digit level of the HS (i.e., the subheading 
level). This spans over 5,000 categories, implying an upper bound for the total number of product-
specific rules of origin (PSRO) to be codified of 200,000 given there are some 400 PTAs in force. 
Concording different sets of RoO and PSRO to each other and automating the codification of PRSO 
using algorithms to classify different RoO into “types” is a major challenge and in practice may not be 
a realistic option given the variation in the “format“ and textual language used to define PRSO across 
different PTAs and non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements. 
Efforts have been made to classify RoO by type and to factor in an ex ante assessment of the 
restrictiveness of different types of RoO on the basis of a mix of judgment and econometric 
estimation. Estevadeordal (1999) pioneered such analysis, focusing on NAFTA RoO with the aim to 
assess the possible impact of extending the NAFTA model to other PTAs in the Americas. An 
important contribution of this research and subsequent efforts to assess the economic effects of RoO is 
a methodology for the measuring the restrictiveness of rules of origin in relation to a tariff phase-out 
schedule negotiated under a PTA. The approach was applied to a potential EU-Mercosur PTA using 
the framework of the pan-European RoO (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004; 2006). The index of 
restrictiveness developed by Estevadeordal and subsequent analysts that have built on his approach 
has been mostly used for econometric analyses of the impact of RoO.  
NAFTA RoO were negotiated at the product level (mostly at the six-digit tariff line level) and were 
defined using three methods: (1) a tariff shift, (2) a regional value content (RVC), or (3) a technical 
requirement. The first criterion can be specified as requiring a change at the section level (two-digit 
HS), heading level (four-digit HS), subheading level (six-digit HS), or item level (higher than six-digit 
HS), with the possibility of including specific exceptions. The three methods could also be combined, 
for example, a change of subheading plus a specific RVC and a technical requirement. Moreover, 
there are many cases in which the agreement defines alternative rules of origin for the same product.  
To obtain the restrictiveness index, each rule or set of rules is codified according to different 
criteria and a qualitatively ordered index is constructed based on a set of assumptions. First, a change 
of tariff classification (CTC) at the chapter level is assumed to be more stringent than at the heading 
level, a change at the heading level more than at the subheading level, and so on. Second, a regional 
value content requirement increases the restrictiveness of a given rule, as do technical requirements. 
For each pair (or sometimes trio) of alternative rules being applied to the same product, Estevadeordal 
selects the one with the higher restrictiveness index. A categorical RoO variable is then constructed 
ranging from 1 (the most lenient) to 7 (the most restrictive). Level 1 occurs when the rule requires a 
change of tariff item or less. At level 2 the rule requires more than a change of tariff item but is equal 
to or less than a change of tariff subheading (CTSH). At level 3 the rule requires more than a CTSH 
but is equal to or less than a CTSH and RVC. At level 4 the rule requires more than a CTSH and RVC 
but is equal to or less than a change of tariff heading (CTH). At level 5 the rule requires more than a 
change of tariff level but is equal to or less than CTH and RVC. At level 6 the rule requires more than 
a change of tariff level and a RVC but is equal to or less than a change of chapter (CC). Finally, at 
level 7 the rule requires more than a CC but is equal to or less than a CC or technical requirement. 
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Although the HS increasingly is used for drafting RoO, it was conceived for tariff classification 
purposes and not for drafting RoO. It follows that assuming that a change of tariff classification at the 
eight-digit level is more lenient than a CTSH is rather arbitrary. As demonstrated in the WTO 
negotiations on nonpreferential RoO, there are entire chapters of the HS in which a CTSH may be 
extremely restrictive. This is the case for chemical products, for example, where a important chemical 
reactions that change the nature of a product may not be reflected in a change of subheading. It is quite 
difficult therefore to determine the level of restrictiveness of different RoO using criteria and 
classification of the type just discussed. To illustrate the problem, assume we want to classify the 
restrictiveness of the rules using the Estevadeordal index in the following cases (using NAFTA RoO): 
Rule 1  “A change to heading 6205.90 from any other chapter, except from heading Nos. 51.06 
through 51.13, 52.04 through 52.12 . . . provided that the good is both cut and sewn or 
otherwise assembled in the territory of one or more of the NAFTA parties.” 
Rule 2  “A change to heading 62.06 through 62.10 from any other chapter, except from headings 
Nos. 51.06 through 51.13 . . . provided that the good is both cut and sewn or otherwise 
assembled in the territory of one or more of the NAFTA countries.” 
Rule 3  “A change to heading 61.05 through 61.06 from any other chapter, except from headings 
Nos. 51.06 through 51.13, 52.04 through 52.12 . . . provided that the good is both cut (or 
knit to shape) and sewn or otherwise assembled in the territory of one or more of the 
NAFTA parties.” 
Rule 4  “A change to heading 63.02 from any other chapter, except from headings Nos. 51.06 
through 51.13, 52.04 through 52.12, 53.07 through 53.08 or 53.10 through 53.11, Chapters 
54 through 55, or heading Nos. 58.01 through 58.02 or 60.01 through 60.02 provided that 
the good is both cut (or knit to shape) and sewn or otherwise assembled in the territory of 
one or more of the NAFTA parties.” 
Because none of these rules includes a RVC, the choice in terms of the level of restrictiveness 
according to the Estevadeordal index is either level 1 or level 2. Because the rules require more than a 
change of tariff item, one may classify all the rules under level. Alternatively, if one considers that 
requirements for cutting and sewing are technical requirements, they would fall under level 7.  
A closer look at rules 1 to 4 indicates that they are very different in terms of “real world” 
restrictiveness. Rule 1 depicts a single transformation requirement from woven silk to a silk shirt. 
Rule 2 requires a double transformation: (1) the processing of the fabric and (2) the production of the 
apparel. Rule 3 requires a triple transformation or yarn forward: from the manufacturing of the yarn to 
men’s shorts. Rule 4 provides for an extremely stringent rule requiring a quadruple transformation. 
Thus the example shows that even if the drafting style of rules in this case, “A change to heading… 
from any other chapter, except from headings …” is similar and maps the rules to similar levels of 
restrictiveness, the actual level of restrictiveness implied by the different rules may vary considerably. 
These considerations have implications for the development of a taxonomy for codifying RoO for 
NTM classification purposes. They imply that any such classification should not incorporate a 
typology that maps RoO into different degrees of (presumptive) trade restrictiveness and builds this 
into the classification. The extent to which different RoO regimes – and differences in RoO regimes – 
impede trade should be left to empirical analysis. The key challenge in developing a classification for 
NTM purposes is to characterize and “map” different approaches and requirements into common and 
comparable categories at a useful level of disaggregation– what is denoted in this paper as the “form” 
taken by PSRO. If the classification is designed at too broad a level, limiting the coding to the main 
principles used to define origin, there is little value added since this will result in different sets of RoO 
being compared or lumped together on the basis of oversimplified assumptions that do not reflect the 
complexity and diversity of RoO. On the other hand, if the taxonomy is designed in a very detailed 
manner, the task of codification becomes very difficult to operationalize in a way that is useful. 
A possible way to proceed in designing a taxonomy that reflects the reality of RoO that vary 
substantially is to use a limited set of codes that reflect the practices reflected in the major existing 
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models of rules of origin. Such a compromise approach brings the number of codes down to a 
manageable level while providing sufficient detail on the nature and criteria used in different RoO 
without implying (imposing) a value judgment as regards levels of implied restrictiveness. Appendix 1 
illustrates what such an approach could look like, using examples taken from different RoO regimes to 
inform a codification exercise especially in the case of preferential rules of origin.
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The task is considerably easier in the case of drafting a taxonomy for codifying the administrative 
part of rules of origin i.e. related to the documentary evidence required to demonstrate compliance 
with RoO. This is because the administrative dimensions of RoO mostly apply across all products – 
there are seldom product-specific administrative requirements. When there are, they mostly apply at 
broad category levels (an example is textiles and apparel in certain US PTAs). There are only a limited 
number of ways of administering RoO. The most used methodologies are: (i) certificate of origin on 
paper issued by certifying authorities with use of stamps and/or signatures; (ii) certificate or statement 
of origin issued by the exporter (with or without registration with certifying authorities); and (iii) a 
statement of origin issued by the importer. 
Overreliance by some customs administrations on archaic forms of administering RoO based on 
documentary evidence, i.e., a certificate of origin, the exchange of seals and signatures of certifying 
officers, or non-manipulation certificates issued in the country of transit, has made administration of 
RoO into a non-tariff barrier. Shifting to a Customs-authorised exporter declaration of origin with 
retroactive checks and post-clearance recovery offers one model for reducing RoO-related 
administrative costs. The 2017 reform of EU RoO for its GSP regime provides for listing registered 
exporters in a database administered by national customs agencies. Registered exporters will be given 
a number and may issue a declaration of origin. When this self-declaration is presented at an EU port 
of entry, customs will consult the joint database to ascertain whether the exporter has been registered 
and, if so, will grant preferential tariff rates. Verification of an exporter’s declaration and post-
clearance recovery are part of this administrative method. This is an example of a reform in the 
administration of RoO that may facilitate trade. There are other options as well, such as the method 
employed by US Customs and Border Protection, which is based on importer declarations and 
disregards evidence provided by exporters or certificates of origin issued by third parties. Whatever 
method is used, reliance on certificates of origin and the exchange of seals and signatures should be a 
thing of the past. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The subject of RoO and especially nonpreferential RoO has been contested for decades. The nature of 
RoO - a technical and tedious subject – is not one that attracts the interest of trade policy officials and 
Ministers. Yet these same actors are prone to use RoO when convenient, to please or displease lobbies 
and trading partners. Business has been ambivalent on the issue of RoO. On the one hand they often 
complain about the complexity of RoO but on the other hand they do not push Governments to make 
the extra effort required to seek a multilateral solution. The focus instead has been on “easy fixes” in 
bilateral deals (PTAs), which are seen as more appealing and less costly. A focus on PTAs may also 
reflect the evolving nature of international (regional) trade – e.g., the rise in the intensity of regional 
value or supply chains – which has led businesses to push negotiators and governments to simplify the 
RoO applying to PTAs. 
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 A version of this taxonomy was developed as a contribution to the Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) established in 
2006 to work on the taxonomy of NTMs. Discussions are still ongoing among the members of MAST (which comprises 
eight international organizations) and the approach in Appendix 1 is simply a proposal that we consider to be informative 
and operational but that may not be adopted by the group. This proposal includes preferential and nonpreferential Ro) 
with the caveat that the section on nonpreferential rules requires further study to fine tune and better reflect existing 
practices. 
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The preliminary results of ongoing research outlined in this paper shows that the two large players, 
the EU and US, have made progress towards simplification of RoO in their PTAs. There are have been 
some positive spillovers, as demonstrated by the high utilization rates recorded in some US and EU 
PTAs. The issue at stake for the trading system is how to leverage these various positive developments 
and to cross fertilize (multilateralize) the simplifications introduced on both sides of the Atlantic to 
span trade arrangements involving the rest of the world. One path to do so is to break the wall that has 
separated preferential and nonpreferential rules of origin. In a number of sectors like chemicals both 
business and the existing RoO have already built a bridge across the preferential and nonpreferential 
RoO divide. Discussions in the CRO and elsewhere that are aimed at greater harmonization and 
simplification of RoO would be facilitated by further development and use of the type of taxonomy 
proposed in this paper to measure convergence in PRSO. This would demonstrate to the sceptics that 
progress and simplification is possible and has already taken place.  
Single transformation as a good rule of thumb for drafting RoO in a world characterized by global 
value chain-based production. Given that this type of production involves firms specializing in specific 
tasks or activities, RoO that entail a need for more extensive value addition or transformation will 
undercut the ability of countries to engage in this type of production and trade unless they are part of 
larger regional integration arrangements that permit cumulation for RoO purposes. This is not the case 
for many developing nations and the design of RoO therefore should reflect this reality. Traditional 
protectionist double or triple transformation requirements greatly impede participation in value chains. 
While it will be difficult to abolish such RoO for “sensitive sectors” – e.g., textiles and clothing for the 
US, certain processed agricultural products in the EU and Japan – the fact that progress on this front 
has proved possible in the context of implementing duty-free, quota-free market access programs for 
LDCs and that for many products PTAs have been moving to greater use of single transformation-
based RoO criteria are positive signs. Sceptics may continue to argue that such a simple rule of thumb 
is unthinkable but the evidence from recent PTAs and developments in the administration of 
nonreciprocal preferences schemes suggests that efforts to bring together the relevant actors (firms, 
Customs and trade officials) can allow reforms to be agreed and implemented. 
Such a process is distinct from efforts to categorize RoO as NTMs. Developing a taxonomy to 
codify rules of origin for NTM classification purposes is important to be able to determine the effects 
of RoO – i.e., as an input into empirical analysis. The aim here in our view should be simply to 
classify RoO regimes and approaches so as to provide a better sense of how RoO are defined and thus 
the degree to which they are similar or different. RoO have characteristics that distinguish them from 
other regulatory policies that can characterized as NTMs such as product standards. In the case of SPS 
and TBT measures, compliance with a regulation is a necessary condition for being able to export 
(sell) a product – e.g., a TBT labelling requirement to show the quantity of sulphites in a bottle of 
wine. In the case of RoO the NTM-effect takes the form of a conditional tax: if the RoO is not 
satisfied an importer must pay the relevant MFN tariff, the applicable antidumping duty, etc. It is 
never the case that a product would be prohibited from entering the market as would be the case when 
binding quotas are in place or specific SPS or TBT measures must be met. That said, clearly different 
types of RoO and the specific criteria that apply will have a differential impact on the cost of 
production and thus the probability that an exporter will choose (or be forced) to pay the applicable 
MFN tariff.  
The technicalities of RoO and the heterogeneity in how they are worded makes this instrument of 
trade policy a difficult subject for any NTM taxonomy. The approach presented in Appendix 1 for 
grouping and classifying RoO that is based on the main models used in PTAs may be useful as one 
input into a typology of RoO that in turn could be used as the basis for empirical assessments of the 
effects of RoO. Such an effort could also by useful in identifying where RoO have largely converged 
and where they differ.  
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Appendix 1. A draft taxonomy of RoO for NTM purposes 
O1 Preferential ROO 
Paragraph 2 of Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin defines preferential rules of origin 
as follows: “ Preferential rules of origin shall be defined as those laws, regulations and administrative 
determinations of general application applied by any Member to determine whether goods qualify for 
preferential treatment under contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff 
preferences going beyond the application of paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994.“ 
Preferential rules of origin are those rules of origin generally contained in autonomous 
arrangements such as those called for by the Generalized System of Preferences, Everything But Arms 
(EBA) or the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) and reciprocal trade preferences 
negotiated in free trade agreements.  
O11 - Origin criterion 
This criterion determines the origin of a good. A good is either originating in a country since a) it is 
wholly obtained in a country i.e. it does not contain any non- originating material, b) it has undergone 
substantial transformation in that country. 
The category of wholly obtained products is often a general standard list of products, albeit with 
notable differences, that is contained in every set of rules of origin. 
Substantial transformation may be defined by a) ad valorem percentage criterion, b) change of 
tariff classification, and c) specific working or processing requirement.  
O111 - Wholly Obtained 
The origin status is conferred to a good that is entirely produced or manufactured in a country 
without using non-originating materials. 
Example: live animals born and raised in a country; vegetables that have been grown 
and harvested in a country. 
O112 - Substantial transformation: ad valorem percentage criterion for value addition 
The originating status is conferred to a good that has complied with a given percentage of 
value added. The calculation of such value-added results from adding the cost of originating 
materials used in its production plus the direct cost of processing as a percentage of a given 
finished price of the good, normally ex-factory price.  
 
The formula is normally made of the following components: Cost of originating materials + 
direct cost of processing   x 100   ≥   than a given value added / appraised value (ex – factory 
price) 
 
Example: “For an imported article to be GSP‐eligible, it must be the growth, product, 
or manufacture of a BDC, and the sum of the cost or value of materials produced in 
the BDC plus the direct costs of processing must equal at least 35 percent of the 
appraised value of the article at the time of entry into the United States
12
.”    
                                                     
12
 See US GSP Handbook 2015 available at For an imported article to be GSP‐eligible, it must be the growth, product, or 
manufacture of a BDC, and the sum of the cost or value of materials produced in the BDC plus the direct costs of 
processing must equal at least 35 percent of the appraised value of the article at the time of entry into the United States.  
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O113 - Substantial transformation: ad valorem percentage criterion as value of materials 
The originating status is conferred to a good that does not exceed a given amount of non-
originating material out of a given finished price of the good, normally ex-works price or FOB 
price or achieve a minimum content of originating materials. The value of material can be 
calculated by subtraction.  
 
Example of a rule providing not to exceed a given percentage of non-originating 
materials: Manufacture in which the value of all the (non-originating) material used 
does not exceed 70 % of the ex-works price of the product
13
. 
 
Example of a rule providing to comply with a value of materials calculated by 
subtraction: 
 
Build-down Method
14
: Based on the Value of Non-Originating Materials. 
               
                                                            Value of the Good – VNM   
RVC (X %) =           x 100           
                                     Value of the Good 
 
Example of rule providing to comply with a minimum value of originating materials: 
 
Build-up Method
15
: Based on the Value of Originating Materials: 
 
                                                                           VOM 
RVC (X %) =           x 100                    
                                      Value of the Good  
 
Where:  
 RVC is the regional value content of a good, expressed as a percentage; 
 VNM is the value of non-originating materials, including materials of 
undetermined origin, used in the production of the good;  
 VOM is the value of originating materials used in the production of the good in 
the territory of one or more of the Parties.            
                   
O114 - Substantial Transformation: change in tariff classification (CTC) with product specific rules of 
origin (PSRO) at HS chapter and HS heading level and   exceptions at HS 4 digits 
The originating status is conferred to a good that is classified in a different tariff classification 
of the non- originating materials used and the product specific rules of origin are set at chapter 
and heading level. The CTC exceptions are usually contained in an additional annex or 
protocol attached to the tariff preferences or the trade agreement. The CTC exceptions are 
expressed in the form of CTC at HS chapter level or heading level but not at subheading level 
(6 digits of the HS). 
 
                                                     
13
 See list of product specific rules in COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 
establishing the Community Customs Code.  
14
 Example excerpted from TPP text available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Rules-of-Origin-and-
Origin-Procedures.pdf 
15
 Example excerpted from TPP text available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Rules-of-Origin-and-
Origin-Procedures.pdf 
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Example of a general rule. Working or processing operations will be considered 
sufficient when the resulting goods are classified under an HS tariff heading (4 digits) 
other than that covering each of the non-originating materials or parts used in the 
production
16
. 
 
Example of an exception to the general CTC rule using HS chapter exclusion: 
heading 17.01 - Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, in solid form - 
Manufactured from products other than those of Chapter 12 or 17
17
. 
 
Example of a product specific rules of origin (PSRO) exception to the general CTC 
rule using HS heading exclusion (a): heading 72.29 - Wire of other alloy steel - 
Manufactured from products other than those of heading 72.27 to 72.29
18
. 
 
Example of a product specific rule of origin (PSRO) using HS heading exclusion 
(b): heading 7217 - Wire of iron or non-alloy steel - Manufacture from semi-finished 
materials of heading 7207
19
. 
O115 - Substantial Transformation: change in tariff classification: with product specific rules of 
origin (PSRO) at HS heading level and subheading level with single or multiple exceptions of 
CTC, including Change of tariff subheading at six digit level 
The originating status is conferred to a good that is classified in a different tariff classification 
of the non-originating materials used and the product specific rules of origin may be set at 
chapter level, heading level or subheading level
20
. The CTC exceptions are expressed at HS 
chapter level (HS 2 digits), heading level (HS 4 digits), at subheading level (6 digits of the 
HS) or a combination thereof.  
 
Example of a product specific rule of origin (PSRO) set at tariff item level using 
exception at chapter level. A change to tariff items 1901.20.02, 1901.20.05, 
1901.20.15, 1901.20.20, 1901.20.25, 1901.20.30, 1901.20.35 or 1901.20.40 from any 
other chapter, except from chapter 4
21
. 
 
Example of a product specific rule of origin set at tariff item level using exceptions 
at heading levels. A change to tariff items 2106.90.12, 2106.90.15 or 2106.90.18 from 
any other tariff item, except from headings 2203 through 2209
22
. 
 
Example of a product specific rule of origin set at subheading level using 
exceptions at heading levels.  2008.11 A change to a good of subheading 2008.11 
from any other chapter, except from heading 12.02
23
. 
Example of a product specific rule of origin set at subheading level using multiple 
exceptions at heading level. 6110.12 to 6110.19: A change to a good of subheading 
6110.12 through 6110.19 from any other chapter, except from heading 51.06 through 
                                                     
16
 See Japan GSP scheme general rule at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/gsp/explain.html#section8 
17
 See List of product specific rules of origin in the GSP scheme of Japan at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000077857.pdf 
18
 See List of product specific rules of origin in the GSP scheme of Japan at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000077857.pdf 
19
 See EU list of product specific rules of origin of EBA at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:307:0001:0081:EN:PDF 
20
 In the case of NAFTA it may be set at tariff items level) 8 Digits. 
21
 See NAFTA list of products specific rules of origin at https://hts.usitc.gov/currentfile 
22
 See NAFTA list of products specific rules of origin at https://hts.usitc.gov/currentfile 
23
 See TPP product specific rules of origin at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Annex-3-A-Product-
Specific-Rules.pdf 
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51.13, 52.04 through 52.12 or 54.01 through 54.02, subheading 5403.33 through 
5403.39 or 5403.42 through 5403.49, or heading 54.04 through 54.08, 55.08 through 
55.16, 56.06 or 60.01 through 60.06, provided the good is cut or knit to shape, or both, 
and sewn or otherwise assembled in the territory of one or more of the Parties
24
. 
 
Example of a product specific rule of origin set at heading level using exceptions at 
heading levels and chapter level.  Heading 38.25 A change to heading 38.25 from 
any other chapter, except from Chapters 28 through 37, 40, or 90
25
. 
 
Example of a product specific rules of origin set at subheading level using 
exceptions at subheading level. 2008.99 - Other - Change of HS chapter except from 
subheading 0810.90 and 0812.90, or taro of subheading 0714.90
26
. 
O116 - Substantial Transformation: working of processing requirement 
The originating status is conferred to a good that has undergone a specific working or 
processing requirement. 
 
Example. Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted: 
Manufacture from fabric
27
. 
O117 - Alternative requirements 
The originating status may be conferred to a good that has fulfilled one of two alternative 
requirements.   
Example (a). Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders 
and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and 
accessories of such articles; except for: Manufacture from materials of any heading, 
except that of the product or Manufacture in which the value of all the materials used 
does not exceed 70 % of the ex-works price of the product
28
. 
 
Example (b).  8411.22 Turbo-propellers: of a power exceeding 1,100 kW: Regional 
Value content of (40) or CTSH, except from subheadings 8411.11 through 8411.82. 
 
O12 – Cumulation 
O121 - Bilateral 
This cumulation is granted as donor country content rules in the context of the GSP and is also 
common in bilateral FTAs. 
 
                                                     
24
 See TPP product specific rules of origin at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Annex-3-A-Product-
Specific-Rules.pdf 
25
 See product specific rules of origin for US-Korea at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Annex_6-
A_SPECIFIC_RULES_OF_ORIGIN.pdf  
26
 See text of ASEAN –Japan EPA product specific rules of origin at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/asean/annex2.pdf 
27
 COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 
laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code. 
28
 COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 
laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs. 
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Example. In addition, a total of up to 15% of the 35% local content value (as 
appraised at the US port of entry) may consist of US-originating parts and materials. 
This concept is called “bilateral cumulation of origin”)29. 
O122 - Diagonal   
This cumulation is usually granted on a regional basis under autonomous preferential 
arrangements like the GSP or in the context of the FTAs. It allows to consider originating 
material the materials that are already originating in other member states of the regional 
grouping.  
 
Example. “Originating in a country of one regional group shall be considered as 
materials originating in a country of the other regional group when incorporated in a 
product obtained there, provided that the working or processing carried out in the 
latter beneficiary country goes beyond the operations described in Article 78(1) and, 
in the case of textile products, also beyond the operations set out in Annex 16.”30 
 O1123 - Full 
This cumulation is usually granted in the context of the FTAs. It allows to consider working 
and processing carried out in the other partner(s) as being carried out in the country where the 
last transformation takes place. 
 
Example. “Working or processing carried out in the EU, in the other EAC Partner 
States, in the other ACP States or in the OCTs shall be considered as having been 
carried out in an EAC Partner State when the products produced undergo subsequent 
working or processing in this EAC Partner State
31. “ 
 O1124 - n.e.s   
This cumulation is provided for in some EU FTAs agreement and in the EBA as well as in 
Canada-Peru FTAs Agreement usually defined as cross- cumulation. It allows to cumulate 
among different kind of agreements or preferential arrangements.   
 
Example. Extended cumulation. At the request of any beneficiary country’s 
authorities, extended cumulation between a beneficiary country and a country with 
which the European Union has a free-trade agreement in accordance with Article 
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in force, may be 
granted by the Commission, provided that each of the following conditions is met: (a) 
the countries involved in the cumulation have undertaken to comply or ensure 
compliance with this Section and to provide the administrative cooperation necessary 
to ensure the correct implementation of this Section both with regard to the European 
Union and also between themselves. (b) the undertaking referred to in point (a) has 
been notified to the Commission by the beneficiary country concerned.
32
 
                                                     
29
 https://agoa.info/about-agoa/rules-of-origin.html 
30
 See EU regulation COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing 
the Community Customs Code. 
31
 See Paragraph 3 of article 4 of Protocol 1 of the EU –EAC Economic Partnership Agreement available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153845.compressed.pdf 
32
 See paragraph 7 of article 86 of see EU regulation COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 
2010 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. 
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O13 - Proof of origin  
A proof of origin is a document or statement which serves as a documentary evidence of the 
originating status of the goods to which it relates. Proofs of origin include certificates of origin issues 
by certifying authorities, a self-declaration of origin by exporters, or a declaration of origin made by 
the importer. 
O131 A certificate of origin issued by a certifying authority 
A document where a government authority or body empowered to issue proofs of origin 
expressly certifies that the good is considered originating according to the applicable rules of 
origin. 
 
Example. RULE 1. The Certificate of Origin shall be issued by the Government 
authorities of the exporting Party. RULE 2 (a) The Party shall inform all the other 
Parties of the names and addresses of their respective Government authorities issuing 
the Certificate of Origin and shall provide specimen signatures and specimen of 
official seals used by their said Government authorities. (b) The above information 
and specimens shall be provided to every Party to the Agreement and a copy furnished 
to the ASEAN Secretariat. Any change in names, addresses, or official seals shall be 
promptly informed in the same manner
33
. 
O132 - A certificate of origin issued by exporter 
A document where the exporter certifies that the good is considered originating according to the 
applicable rules of origin either by delegated authority of by registration. 
 
Example. The Registered Exporter system (the REX system) is the system of 
certification of origin of goods that will be applied in the Generalised System of 
Preference (GSP) of the European Union as from 1 January 2017. It is based on a 
principle of self-certification by economic operators who will make out themselves 
so-called statements on origin. To be entitled to make out a statement on origin, an 
economic operator will have to be registered in a database by his competent 
authorities. The economic operator will become a "registered exporter
34
. 
O133 - Importer declaration  
A document where the importer expressly certifies that the good is considered originating according to 
the applicable rules of origin. 
Example. Whenever articles are entered with a claim for the duty exemption provided 
in this paragraph-- (1) the importer shall be deemed to certify that such articles meet 
all of the conditions for duty exemption
35
. 
O14 - Proof of direct shipment 
A proof of direct shipment is required. 
 
                                                     
33
 See ASEAN China FTA at http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2013/economic/afta/ACFTA/3-
%20ACFTA%20TIG%20Annex%203.pdf 
34
 See https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/rules-origin/general-aspects-preferential-
origin/arrangements-list/generalised-system-preferences/the_register_exporter_system_en 
35
 See general notes to the US Harmonized tariff schedule at 
file:///Users/stefanoinama/Downloads/General%20Notes%20(4).pdf 
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Example. The goods must be shipped directly on a TBL to a consignee in Canada from the 
beneficiary or LDC in which the goods were certified. Evidence in the form of a TBL (or a 
copy) showing that the goods have been shipped directly to a consignee in Canada must be 
presented to the CBSA upon request. An importer may be requested to submit further 
documentation to substantiate the TBL, such as sales order, report of entry documents, and 
cargo control documents
36
. 
O2 Non-preferential ROO37 
Article 1 of part 1 of the WTO agreement on Rules of Origin defines non – preferential rules of origin 
as follows “For the purposes of Parts I to IV of this Agreement, rules of origin shall be defined as 
those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied by any 
Member to determine the country of origin of goods provided such rules of origin are not related to 
contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond 
the application of paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994.” 
Non-preferential RoO are normally used to apply MFN rates of duty and other WTO agreements. 
Non-preferential rules are distinct from preferential RoO since compliance does not provide for 
preferential tariffs. 
O21 - Origin criterion 
O211 - Wholly Obtained 
The origin status is conferred to a good that is entirely produced or manufactured in a 
country without using non-originating materials.   
 
Example. Live animals born and raised in one country; vegetables that have been 
grown and harvested in one country. 
O212 Substantial transformation: ad valorem percentage criterion as value addition 
The originating status is conferred to a good that has complied with a given percentage of value added. 
The calculation of such value-added results from adding the cost of originating materials used in its 
production plus the direct cost of processing as a percentage of a given finished price of the good, 
normally ex-factory price.  
 
Example. 84.40 - Book-binding machinery, including book sewing machines - CTH; 
or 45% value added rule
38
. 
O213 - Substantial transformation: ad valorem percentage criterion as value of materials 
The originating status is conferred to a good that does not exceed a given amount of nonoriginating 
material out of a given finished price of the good, normally ex-works price or FOB price or achieve a 
minimum content of originating materials. The value of material can be calculated by subtraction.  
                                                     
36
 See Canadian rules at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/dm-md/d11/d11-4-4-eng.html 
37
 This part of the taxonomy on nonpreferential RoO requires further study and validation. 
38
 See EU common customs code at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/roo_chap_84-85_en.pdf.  
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O214 - Substantial Transformation: change in tariff classification: without exception 
The originating status is conferred to a good that is classified in a different tariff classification of the 
non- originating materials used and the product specific rules of origin are set at chapter and heading 
level. The CTC exceptions are usually contained in an additional annex or protocol attached to the 
tariff preferences or the trade agreement. The CTC exceptions are expressed in the form of CTC at HS 
chapter level or heading level but not at subheading level (6 digits of the HS). 
O215 - Substantial Transformation: change in tariff classification: with exception 
 
The originating status is conferred to a good that is classified in a different tariff classification of the 
non-originating materials used and the product specific rules of origin may be set at chapter level, 
heading level or subheading level. The CTC exceptions are expressed at HS chapter level (HS 2 
digits), heading level (HS 4 digits), at subheading level (6 digits of the HS) or a combination thereof. 
O216 - Substantial Transformation: technical requirement 
 
Example. Certain apparel exports receive originating status in the country where they 
are both cut and sewn. 
O217 - Alternative requirements (in the explanatory text: this refers to "or") 
A good’s origin can be determined by using one of two or more criteria available to prove a substantial 
transformation. 
O22 - Proof of origin  
A proof of origin is a document or statement which serves as a prima facie evidence to support that the 
goods to which it relates satisfy the origin criteria under applicable rules of origin. Proofs of origin 
include certificates of origin, a self-issued certificate of origin, or a declaration of origin. 
 
Example. 
O221- issued by authority 
A document where a government authority or body empowered to issue proofs of 
origin expressly certifies that the good is considered originating according to the 
applicable rules of origin. 
 
Example. 
O222 - issued by exporter 
A document where the exporter expressly certifies that the good is considered 
originating according to the applicable rules of origin. 
 
Example. 
O223 - self- declaration 
O224 - importer declaration  
A document where the importer expressly certifies that the good is considered 
originating according to the applicable rules of origin. 
 
Example. 
O229 - Proof of origin: n.e.s. 
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